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Executive summary  
Over the long term (i.e. 10+ years), most economists predict that the decision to leave the EU 
will have a negative impact on trade, labour mobility and investment.  
To date studies have concentrated on the UK as a whole. At the same time, they have 
tended to focus on the aggregate economic impact, with little assessment of the different 
impacts by sector.  
This report closes this gap by providing an inter-regional and multi-sectoral analysis of Brexit 
on Scotland and the rest of the UK.  
To undertake this analysis we examine the geographical pattern of Scottish international 
exports and identify the sectors most exposed to any changing trading relationship with the 
EU. We then make use of an inter-regional macroeconomic model of Scotland and the rest of 
the UK to examine the long-term impact on the Scottish economy. 
Our conclusion is that under all modelled scenarios, Brexit is predicted to have a negative 
impact RQ6FRWODQG¶VHFRQRP\. Based on the modelling and assumptions set out in the 
report, over the long-term a reduced level of trade is expected to result in Scottish GDP being 
between 2% and 5% lower than would otherwise be the case. The range of impacts is driven 
by the nature of any post-Brexit relationship between the UK and the EU ± the stronger the 
economic integration with the EU, the smaller the negative impact. 
We also find that the impact on Scotland, whilst significant, is estimated to be smaller than for 
the UK as a whole. 
Our modelling suggests that ultimately, the size of the relative impact by sector depends on a 
complex interplay between the EU-export intensity of sectoral sales and how responsive 
particular sectors are to changes in competitiveness. 
We recommend that focus is now given to sectors that have close trading links with the EU ± 
e.g. food & drink and some manufacturing sectors ± to fully understand the particular issues 
facing them on a product-by-product basis. However, we also find that other sectors which at 
first glance may not be thought as immediately at rLVNIURPDFKDQJHLQWKH8.¶VUHODWLRQVKLS
with the EU ± e.g. professional services ± should also be considered. This analysis makes 
clear that Brexit is not going to be straightforward.    
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1. Introduction  
The Fraser of Allander Institute (FAI) was commissioned by the 6FRWWLVK3DUOLDPHQW¶V
European and External Relations Committee to model the possible economic implications of 
Brexit for Scotland.   
Over the long term (i.e. 10+ years), most economists predict that the decision to leave the EU 
will ± all else remaining equal ± have a negative impact on trade, labour mobility and 
investment. There remains debate however, over the scale of the impact ± see for example, 
Ebell & Warren (2016), HM Treasury (2016a, b), Centre for Economic Policy (2016), PWC 
(2016) and Oxford Economics (2016).  Capital Economics (2016) provides a more positive 
outlook. There is also debate over possible policy responses that may mitigate some of these 
effects.  
To date however, studies have concentrated on the UK as a whole. At the same time, they 
have tended to focus on the aggregate economic impact, with little assessment of the 
possible different impacts by sector.  
The analysis in this paper aims therefore to begin to shed light on some crucial questions.  
)LUVWO\LVWKHUHOLNHO\WREHDFRPPRQµ8.-ZLGH¶LPSDFWRI%UH[LW"And crucially for our 
interests, what is the possible impact on Scotland? If the effects of Brexit differ across the 
UK, then this would suggest that there may be challenges in securing a consensus over the 
terms of any Brexit deal across English regions and devolved nations.  
Secondly, we ask the same question but this time on a sectoral basis. Can we expect to see 
some sectors more or less impacted than others? If certain parts of the economy are 
relatively more exposed, then this suggests that understanding the implications for 
businesses here, and possible mitigating policy responses, should be an important priority.  
To undertake this analysis we examine the geographical pattern of Scottish international 
exports and identify the sectors most exposed to any changing trading relationship with the 
EU. Next we make use of an inter-regional macroeconomic model of Scotland and the rest of 
the UK (rUK) to examine the long-term impact on the Scottish economy. This inter-regional 
framework is especially useful in that it captures not only direct effects via Scottish-EU export 
linkages, but also crucially, any indirect effects via changes in the rUK economy feeding 
through to Scottish exports to rUK alongside wider competiveness changes. This is 
  
October 2016 4 
University of Strathclyde | Fraser of Allander Institute  
especially important for capturing the links Scottish firms may have to a much larger EU 
value-chain through sales to rUK firms.  
Our conclusion is that under all modelled scenarios, Brexit is predicted to have a negative 
impact on the Scottish economy. Based on the modelling and assumptions set out in this 
report, after around 10 years from the shock, we find Scottish GDP to be between 2% and 
5% lower than would have been the case had the UK (and Scotland) remained in the EU.   
We find that any impact on Scotland, whilst significant, is estimated to be smaller than for the 
UK as a whole. Moreover we find that, in addition to the direct impact of becoming less 
integrated with the EU, there are also important spill-over effects from a slower rUK economy 
feeding through to Scottish sectors and firms.   
The range of impacts is driven by the nature of any post-Brexit relationship between the UK 
and the EU. The scale also GHSHQGVXSRQWKHH[WHQWWRZKLFKSRVVLEOHµG\QDPLF¶HIIHFWV
such as any implications for productivity, are present.  
While the sectoral distribution of effects varies by particular scenario, we find a couple of 
interesting results. The size of the relative long-term impact on a sector depends on a 
complex interplay between the EU-export intensity and sensitivity to changes in 
competitiveness. The first factor intensifies the impact on the sector, while the second may 
help to mitigate the negative effects. Sensitivity to changes in competitiveness is stronger in 
sectors that have a high share of domestic inputs and high exposure to rest of the world 
exports. This effect operates via both a real exchange rate depreciation and a relative fall in 
real wages.  
When analysing the overall macro impact of each sectoral effect one also has to take into 
account the proportion of value added in the total output and the size of the sectoral 
contribution to the Scottish economy. Sectors with high value added, high EU-trade intensity 
and low sensitivity to competitiveness effects will have the strongest negative effect on the 
overall economy. Some of the sectors with high exposure to the EU are relatively small in 
terms of their overall contribution to the Scottish economy1. Finally, some other sectors which 
                                                          
1
 This is not to downplay the possible challenges within these industries, but simply to note their relative scale. 
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might not be immediately exposed to EU trade, could still face relatively large absolute 
impacts if Brexit leads to a more general slowdown in the Scottish economy2. 
In summary therefore, we find that this macroeconomic assessment makes clear that an 
analysis by sector is going to be crucial to understanding the likely impacts on the economy 
from Brexit and the relevant policy responses both to mitigate any negative shock and to take 
advantage of new opportunities. As a macroeconomic study, this report necessarily requires 
a degree of aggregation.  
Having demonstrated the importance of a multi-sectoral approach, we would now 
recommend that the next step should be to examine individual industries and products ± 
particularly within those sectors identified here ± to determine the non-tariff and tariff barriers 
unique to them. The same factors identified by us at the sector level should be taken into 
account when analysing industries and products.  
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 summarises the key channels 
through which Brexit may have an impact on the Scottish and UK economies. Section 3 
provides a short outline of the modelling framework. Section 4 sets out a range of scenarios 
concerning the trading relationships that could hold in a post-Brexit world, whilst Section 5 
presents the key results. Section 6 concludes.  
 
2. Assessing the impact of Brexit on the Scottish economy 
In assessing the possible impact of Brexit on the Scottish economy it is important to separate 
out two key phases ± 1) the short-term and 2) the long-term.  
Short-term impacts 
At the UK level, the decision to leave the EU was clear. However, the exact terms of exit are 
unknown and are likely to remain so for the foreseeable future. Consequently, the 
referendum result has ushered in a period of heightened economic uncertainty and reduced 
                                                          
2
 For example, the results relating to Public Administration are driven ± in part ± by the subsequent impact on overall 
public expenditure rather than a direct trade effect. It should also be noted that this sector includes education (i.e. 
income from overseas students). This is explained below. 
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confidence. In response, businesses and households may postpone spending and 
investment.  
But we should be wary of expecting to see any immediate change in the headline economic 
data for a few months. Most businesses will not ± and cannot ± change their plans overnight 
and many will await greater clarity over the likely outcome of any negotiated settlement 
before responding. For the time being, Scotland and the UK remain within the EU so in terms 
of trade, regulation and free movement nothing has changed thus far.  
Policymakers can intervene to help mitigate both the uncertainty itself ± for example, by 
providing reassurance around long-term trading relationships ± and providing temporary 
support to the economy to help offset any negative short-term impacts.  
After an initial period of political instability, the new UK Government has ± at least for the time 
being ± brought a degree of relative calm back to the political environment. At the same time, 
the Bank of England has responded with a further cut in interest rates, increased Quantitative 
Easing and launched a new Term Funding Scheme to ensure that interest rate cuts are 
passed on to businesses.  
In our July Economic Commentary, we discussed the possible channels through which the 
referendum outcome could have an impact over the short-term3.  Whilst we await official data 
post-June4, most of the emerging evidence points toward businesses and the wider economy 
being LQµZDLWDQGVHH¶PRGHZLWKWKHDFWLRQVRIWKH8.*RYHUQPHQWDQGWKH%DQNRI(QJODQG
averting any immediate large negative shock5. However, concern about the possible 
implications over the months ahead clearly remains.  
Long-term impacts 
According to first principles, the likely long-term impacts of leaving the EU are known with a 
relative degree of confidence, albeit the exact quantitative effects are uncertain.  
                                                          
3
 See http://www.strath.ac.uk/business/economics/fraserofallanderinstitute/economic_commentary/  
4
 Data on Scottish GDP for the post-EU referendum period will not be available until January 2017.  
5
 See for example Q3 2016 Royal Bank of Scotland Scottish Business Monitor produced by the Fraser of Allander 
Institute - https://www.sbs.strath.ac.uk/feeds/news.aspx?id=1047   
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Trade opens up businesses to new opportunities for exporting and investment. Labour 
mobility boosts labour supply helping to increase productivity and address demographic 
challenges in countries ± such as Scotland ± with an ageing population. Competition helps 
efficiency, product specialisation and growth. And financial integration deepens and broaden 
capital markets. All of these ± on balance ± are expected to be impacted in one way or 
another by becoming less integrated with the EU.  
Whether or not the decision to leave the EU leads to a permanent reduction in the rate of 
growth or the level of output is unclear. On the one hand, once the economy adjusts to life 
outside the EU, output could simply be a broadly constant step below the level it otherwise 
would have been in each and every year. There is the potential however, for Brexit to have a 
more damaging impact if it were to confine both Scotland and the UK to a lower long-term 
growth rate (perhaps via a permanent hit to productivity growth).  
To assess the likely implications of Brexit on the Scottish economy in the long term, a helpful 
place to start is to look at the degree of trade integration between Scotland and the EU. The 
Scottish Government publishes Export Statistics Scotland each year ± a National Statistics 
SXEOLFDWLRQSURYLGLQJHVWLPDWHVRI6FRWODQG¶VLQWHUQDWLRQDOH[SRUWVDQGH[SRUWVWRWKHU8.6.  
Table 1 shows the value of Scottish exports to the EU within Services and Manufacturing 
(with the largest sectors within these categories also included).  
These statistics are helpful in identifying the sectors and industries that are most likely to be 
directly exposed to any changing trade relationship with the EU. By rank, many of the largest 
sectors are in manufacturing ± including Food & Drink ± but Scotland also has key exports in 
services, particularly those tied to professions such as legal services, R&D activities, 
education, IT and finance.  
Many of these sectors are likely to be the ones where any immediate interest in potential 
policy responses and/or ensuring that their interests are represented in any trade 
negotiations should be targeted. Clearly the particular issues for individual sectors will vary 
DQGQRWMXVWEHGHWHUPLQHGE\µVL]H¶EXWDOVRE\sensitivity to changes in competitiveness, 
due to any real exchange rate depreciation and a relative fall in real wages, and the extent to 
                                                          
6
 EU export data contained here - 
http://www.gov.scot/Topics/Statistics/Browse/Economy/Exports/ESSPublication/ESSAddTables  
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which non-tariff barriers, customs controls ± and in certain scenarios ± tariffs will play a 
particular role in their sector.  
Table 1: EU Exports by Industry Sector, 2014 
 (£ million) Share of international exports 
Total EU Exports 11,560 43% 
Manufacturing 6,695 47% 
Food & Drink 1,775 37% 
Coke, refined petroleum and chemical products 1,775 83% 
Machinery and Equipment NEC 650 37% 
Rubber & Plastic Products 575 71% 
Computer, electronic and optical products 555 50% 
Services 3,885 40% 
Wholesale & Retail 1,095 61% 
Professional Services 760 32% 
Administrative and Support Services 380 30% 
Transportation and Storage 355 63% 
Other 980 57% 
Source: Scottish Export Statistics (2016)7 
Examining statistics such as Table 1 is therefore a useful exercise but it will only get you so 
far. What is also needed is an assessment about how wider economic channels will in turn 
feed through to the overall Scottish economy.  
To assess these long-term implications, it is necessary to use a macroeconomic model of the 
Scottish economy where we can isolate these various channels. At the same time, it is vital 
that we capture not just changes in Scottish trade relationships with the EU, but also 
6FRWODQG¶Vtrade relationships with the UK, given we know that Scotland is deeply integrated 
into the UK supply chain which in turn exports significant amounts to the EU.  
It is important to note that this modelling exercise takes other policy dynamics as fixed. Whilst 
it is entirely possible that policy may respond in the aftermath of Brexit ± e.g. possible new 
trade deals with 3rd countries ± we hold such things constant. Our aim is simply to compare 
the modelled outcomes pre and post-Brexit.   
                                                          
7
 There remain ongoing questions around the quality and completeness of export data for Scotland. However, the 
Scottish Export Statistics remain the best source for information on Scottish exports. The need for greater coverage of 
Scottish trade should be an urgent priority for both the Scottish and UK Governments.   
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3. Modelling Framework 
To undertake this analysis we make use of a Computable General Equilibrium (CGE) 
framework ± a technical economic modelling approach widely used by governments and 
organisations across the world including the Scottish Government, HMRC and the World 
Trade Organisation8.   
CGE models provide detailed representation of the economy which capture the interlinkages 
between the private sector, government and households.  
They combine economic data with a complex system of equations to give an accurate picture 
of the structure and operation of the economy. Economic relationships in the model are 
based on theory and empirical evidence. 
In this exercise, we use an 18 sector inter-regional model of Scotland and the rUK developed 
by researchers at the Fraser of Allander Institute. In this framework, Scotland and rUK are 
modelled simultaneously. This model is useful if the particular research question is targeted 
at analysing possible spill-over effects from Scotland into rUK (and vice versa). Given that 
Brexit is a shock to both Scotland and rUK this is vital.   
It is a multi-sectoral, imperfectly competitive Computable General Equilibrium model. It 
captures ± in the most realistic way possible ± the structure of the Scottish and UK 
economies. It generates estimates of the impacts of any shock, such as Brexit, on aggregate 
and sectoral levels of gross output, GDP, employment, unemployment, the capital stock, 
population levels, and real wages. 
The technical details of the model are set out in Lecca et al (2013, 2014).  
  
                                                          
8
 See for example - 
https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/263652/CGE_model_doc_131204_new.
pdf  
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4. Scenarios 
Given the uncertainties surrounding the form that Brexit may take, we need to consider 
alternative futures, reflecting a range of different possible trading relationships.  
We were asked to consider three scenarios: 
i.  µ1RUZD\¶PRGHO 
This scenario implies that the UK will be characterised by: 
x membership of the European Economic Area (EEA); 
x full access to the Single Market but outside customs union and therefore subject to 
µHFRQRPLFERUGHU¶LQFOXGLQJµUXOHVRIRULJLQ¶9; 
x QRWEHLQJSDUW\WRWKH(8¶VWUDGHGHDOs with the rest of the world; 
x being obliged to make a financial contribution to the EU and accept majority of EU 
laws; and, 
x free movement.  
ii. µ6ZLW]HUODQG¶PRGHO 
This scenario implies that the UK will be characterised by: 
x membership of the European Free Trade Association but not the EEA; 
x access to EU market governed by series of bilateral agreements, covering some but 
not all areas of trade (in particular, services are excluded). Outside customs union and 
WKHUHIRUHVXEMHFWWRµHFRQRPLFERUGHU¶LQFOXGLQJµUXOHVRIRULJLQ¶; 
x QRWEHLQJSDUW\WRWKH(8¶VWUDGHGHDOVZLWKWKHUHVWRIWKHZRUOG; 
x making a financial contribution to EU but smaller than Norway's; 
x no general duty to apply EU laws but has to implement some EU regulations to enable 
trade; and,  
x free movement applies.  
                                                          
9
 Norway ± and Switzerland ± are both outside the Common Agricultural and Common Fisheries policies and therefore 
face tariffs on products that fall under its remit. As this is a macroeconomic analysis, we do not model separately the 
potential impact of different tariff and non-tariff barriers by particular sector but instead capture the aggregate impact. In 
this case of agriculture and fisheries, given their different structures, this could possibly lead to this aggregate 
modelling approach underestimating the overall sectoral impact.  
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iii. µ:72¶PRGHO 
7KLVLVWKH³GHIDXOW´ Brexit scenario, which would apply if other deals cannot be secured10. 
This scenario implies that the UK will be characterised by: 
x WTO rules for international trade that apply to all members; 
x no obligation to apply EU laws although traded goods would still have to meet EU 
standards; 
x some tariffs would be in place on trade with the EU; 
x trade in services would be restricted; 
x no financial contribution to EU; and, 
x no free movement. 
Clearly these scenarios are simplifications of any post-Brexit deal the UK will actually secure. 
Indeed, there is no single arrangement that can be taken off-the-shelf and applied 
immediately. The aim of these scenarios is, however, to provide an illustration of the direction 
and scale of possible impacts.  
Each of these scenarios implies a different degree of integration with the EU. In the stylised 
µNorwegian VFHQDULR¶for example, the trading relationship is more open with good access to 
the Single Market. Other non-tariff barriers will still UHPDLQLQFOXGLQJWKHQHHGIRUµFXVWRPV
FRQWUROV¶IRUJRRGVEHLQJH[SRUWHGWRWKH(811.  
µ5XOHVRI2ULJLQ¶DOVRDSSO\LQWKH1RUZHJLDQFDVH7KHVHUHTXLUHH[SRUWHUVWRREWDLQ
certificates to prove the domestic content of their exports. The cost of these can be 
significant, particularly for smaller firms and businesses who rely on complex cross-border 
supply chains. Firms trading with the EU have to submit customs declarations and there can 
be complications with VAT arrangements when products cross borders. This may have 
implications for costs, efficiency and time competitiveness12.  
                                                          
10
 In fact, even in this case we do assume a degree of successful negotiation over tariffs, with a long-term tariff of only 
2% being applied. 
11The relevant form has more than 50 boxes requesting information, and the guidance is 78 pages long. It typically 
requires evidence proving products are either made inside the EEA, or comply with a number of product specific rules. 
For information see - http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-ontent/EN/TXT/HTML/?uri=OJ:L:2005:321:FULL&from=en  
12
 HMT estimate that over half of UK goods exports to the EU would need to be certified as complying with rules of 
origin requirements in order to continue to receive tariff-free access into the Single Market. 
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,QWKHVW\OL]HGµ6ZLW]HUODQGVFHQDULR¶WUDGHin goods remains highly integrated but less so in 
services. The issues set out above for Norway would continue to hold.  
)LQDOO\WKHµ:72VFHQDULR¶DVVXPHVQRVSHFLDOWUDGLQJUHODWLRQVKLSEHWZHHQWKH8.DQGWKH
EU so barriers to trade ± both non-tariff and tariff barriers ± could in principle be higher.  
Initial shock 
We use estimates of the impact on UK exports under these three stylized scenarios identified 
by the National Institute for Economic and Social Research (NIESR) in Ebell and Warren 
(2016). These estimates were based on academic research into the links between alternative 
trading relationships and volumes of economic activity (Baier et al., 2008; Ceglowski, 2006). 
Table 2 provides an estimate of the aggregate impact on trade for µJRRGV¶DQGµVHUYLFHV¶
under each scenario. The anticipated effects relate to the estimated reduction in total trade, 
are substantial13. However, others estimates of these effects, including HM 7UHDVXU\¶VDUH
similar in scale.14 µ2SWLPLVWLF¶DQGµSHVVLPLVWLF¶YDULDQWVUHIHUWRXSSHUDQGORZHUHVWLPDWes of 
the effects.  
In our model each sector has different trade shocks depending on their exposure to the EU 
WUDGH)RUH[DPSOH)LJXUHVKRZVWKHVHFWRUVSHFLILFLQWHUQDWLRQDOWUDGHVKRFNVIRUµ1RUZD\
RSWLPLVWLF¶VFHQDULR7KHDEVROXWHVL]HRIWKHVKRFNLVWKHODUJHVWLQELJVHFWRUVWKDWKDYHWKH
highest exposure to the EU trade: Other Primary15; Wholesale & Retail, Transportation & 
Storage; and Food & Drink.  
 
 
                                                          
13
 The quantitative impact we derive ultimately depends upon the scale and composition of the initial shock. Different 
studies use different estimates of the possible effect of Brexit on trade, although the scale tends to be similar. Of 
course, any quantitative results are sensitive to the precise size of the applied shock, and timescale of adjustment, and 
it is therefore entirely possible to model different shocks (larger or smaller). We have tested for a wide range of 
scenarios and whilst the quantitative impacts change, the qualitative impacts and relative scale of the effects between 
regions, sectors and transmission channels found here still hold. 
14
 The size of the initial shock to each sector reflects its dependence on exports to the EU. The ultimate impact will 
depend on the entire general equilibrium of the system. 
15
 Other Primary includes refined petroleum, petrochemicals and elements of the oil and gas supply chain.  
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Table 2: Impact of various post-Brexit scenarios on 6FRWODQG¶VHxports  
 
Estimated reduction in total exports 
 Goods Services 
Norway Scenario 
  
Optimistic -12% -8% 
Pessimistic -18% -11% 
Switzerland Scenario 
  
Optimistic -12% -18% 
Pessimistic -18% -22% 
WTO Scenario -26% -25% 
Source: Ebell & Warren (2016) 
 
Figure 1: Absolute reduction in exports from Scotland to ROW in £m (Norway optimistic) 
 
This chart therefore provides a helpful first indication of the sectors worthy of attention16.  
                                                          
16
 Within a macroeconomic analysis such as ours, whilst it offers a much richer analysis of sectoral detail than previous 
studies, it is still necessary to have a degree of aggregation. Whilst not impacting on the overall qualitative results, 
some caution should always be used in interpreting exact % point estimates, particularly sectors with the greatest 
complexities in trading and ownership models. For example, both financial services and other primary sectors are 
particularly complex and (in the case of financial services especially) are subject to data limitations. Our reported 
UHVXOWVUHIOHFWWKHVHFWRU¶VGHSHQGHQFHGLUHFWO\DQGLQGLUHFWO\WKURXJKU8.OLQNVRQ(8H[SRUWVWKHVFDOHRIWKH
sectors, and the estimated impact of tariff and non-tariff barriers on goods and services. 
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The sectoral differentiation of the results are driven by a complex combination of factors, 
including direct EU-export intensity of the sector, size, sensitivity to competitiveness effects 
and inter-regional linkages. It is therefore a macroeconomic assessment.  
The exact impact by type of product will in practice be further driven by a number of 
additional complex microeconomic factors such as the specific individual non-tariff and tariff 
barriers relevant not just for sectors but individual products.  
Once again, it should be noted that all scenarios assume no change in policy. Our modelling 
therefore implies that Scotland maintains its initial fiscal balance.  Given that public sector 
revenues will fall in response to the economic shock, this leads to falling government 
expenditure. Over the longer term, there may be a policy response by both the UK and/or 
Scottish Governments ± although given what this could be remains unclear, our modelling 
highlights the outcomes in specified scenarios with no policy response.  
While we do not include it in our core scenarios, we also explore the likely impact of a 5% 
reduction in labour productivity as assumed by HM Treasury (HM Treasury 2016a). While we 
have concerns that such dynamic effects are much more uncertain than the trade effects, for 
completeness we illustrate the potential importance of this factor by simulating a one-off, 
permanent reduction in Scottish (and rUK) labour productivity.17 
 
5. Results 
Throughout all scenarios the estimated negative impact of Brexit on the rUK is greater than it 
is on Scotland, in terms of GDP, employment and other measures. This reflects, in part, the 
fact that rUK has greater exposure to EU trade than Scotland and complex inter-linkages 
between Scotland and the rUK which acerbate/dampen certain effects.  
We discuss the key results below18. 
 
                                                          
17
 This relates to the difference between impacts on the growth rate or the growth level as set out above.   
18
 CGE models are most suited to medium-to long-term effects. They do not take into account the business cycle or 
other short-term fluctuations. All simulations presented here are timed from the moment when the agreement on Brexit 
is implemented.  
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7KHµ1RUZD\¶PRGHO 
Table 3 summaries the long-term (reached after around 10 years) change from the basline 
position that would be implied XQGHUWKHµ1RUZD\¶PRGHOVHWRXWDERYHXQGHUDQµRSWLPLVWLF¶
DQGµSHVVLPLVWLF¶VFHQDULR 
In summary, after around 10 years: 
x Scottish GDP is expected to be between 2% and 3% lower than would otherwise be the 
case ± equivalent to GDP being £3bn-£5bn lower in 2015-16 terms19; 
x Real wages are expected to be between 3% and 4% lower than would otherwise be the 
case; for someone on average full-time earnings in Scotland, this would be equivalent to 
a reduction of £800-£1,200 per year20; 
x A 1-2% reduction in the employment level is expected; this is equivalent to the loss of 
around 30,000 jobs in the optimistic scenario21.  
 
Table 3: Norway model: long-term % changes relative to baseline 
 Optimistic 
% change 
Pessimistic 
% change 
GDP -2.0 -3.1 
Exports -4.4 -6.7 
Real wages -2.9 -4.3 
Employment -1.2 -1.8 
Population +0.8 +1.2 
Source: Fraser of Allander Institute 
Figure 2 illustrates the long-term impact on value-added by sector in 2010 terms. The results 
are driven by a complex combination of factors, including the direct EU-export intensity of the 
sector, size, sensitivity to competitiveness effects and inter-regional linkages.  
As pointed out above, the exact impact by type of product will in practice be driven by a 
number of additional complex microeconomic factors. Our analysis should be seen as an 
                                                          
19
 It should be noted that we refer to onshore Scottish GDP only. 
20
 Based on 2015 Annual Survey of Hours and Earnings (median, gross full-time earnings of £27,710 in Scotland) 
21
 Note the modest rise in population may ± at first glance ± seem somewhat counterintuitive. However, as we will see 
later, the negative shock is greater in the rUK which makes ScotlaQGDµUHODWLYHO\¶PRUHDWWUDFWLYHORFDWLRQWRPRYHWR 
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aggregate assessment and therefore a helpful guide to what individual sectors are worthy of 
particularly detailed examination.  
Figure 2: Long-term level change in value added in the µNorway¶ scenario 
 
Source: Fraser of Allander Institute 
In summary ±  
x In each case, the greatest contraction in value added is experienced by Wholesale & 
Retail, Transportation & Storage; and Professional Services & R&D sectors; 
x Public Administration; and Other Primary are the 3rd and 4th hardest hit sectors in terms 
of value added contraction; 
x Three of these four sectors also register the biggest employment contractions (see 
Figure 3); 
x The different rankings of employment vis-à-vis value-added reflects, in part, the different 
labour intensities of the sectors.  
Another way to look at the results, is to examine what sectors are likely to experience the 
largest percentage declines in employment and output in the long term: 
x Other Primary ± employment 4-7% lower than would otherwise be the case; output 5-8% 
lower; 
x Chemicals & Pharmaceutical ± employment and output both 3-5% lower;  
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x Electrical Manufacturing ± employment and output both 3-5% lower; 
x Rubber, Cement, Glass & Metals manufacturing ± employment 2-4% lower; output 3-5% 
lower. 
 
Figure 3: Long-term level change in full-time equivalent employment in the µNorway scenario¶ 
  
Source: Fraser of Allander Institute 
All sectors are, however, expected to experience some decline in employment and output 
although clearly there are substantial differences both in relative and absolute scale. 
7KHµ6ZLW]HUODQG¶PRGHO 
Table 4 summaries the long-term changes (reached after around 10 years) that would be 
implied under our stylised trading relationship which is similar to that of Switzerland.  In this 
scenario: 
x The anticipated reduction in GDP is larger: in the long-term GDP is expected to be 3-4% 
lower than would otherwise be the case (equivalent to £4bn-£6bn in 2015-16 terms.); 
x Real wages are expected to be around 5-6% (£1,200-£1,600 per year) lower than would 
otherwise be the case and exports 6-8% lower; 
x Employment is projected to fall by 1-2%. 
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Table 4: Switzerland model: long-term % changes relative to baseline 
 Optimistic 
% change 
Pessimistic 
% change 
GDP -2.7 -3.9 
Exports -5.9 -8.4 
Real wages -4.5 -5.8 
Employment -1.4 -2.2 
Population +1.8 +2.3 
Source: Fraser of Allander Institute 
 
The sectoral impact on employment and output differs slightly from the Norway scenario.  
This reflects both the larger scale of shock and the greater impact on services. The sectoral 
impacts also reflect the larger reduction in real wages, which will have differential impacts 
depending on how reliant particular sectors are on labour relative to other inputs, and how 
sensitive they are to changes in competitiveness.  
Figure 4 illustrates the long-term changes in value-added for each sector in the Switzerland 
case: 
x The impact is greater on many sectors, mostly services, but the larger fall in the real 
wage improves competitiveness relative to the Norwegian case and that limits (and in 
one case offsets) the impact on the non-service sectors exposed to trade; 
x The same four sectors contribute most to the overall contraction in GDP as in the 
Norway case, but here the impacts on services are increased; 
x The biggest contraction in value added is experienced by the Wholesale & Retail Trade, 
Transportation & Storage sector; 
x Professional Services & R&D; Public Administration; and Other Primary are the 2nd, 3rd 
and 4th hardest hit;  
x The greater impact on Public Administration reflects the bigger contraction in GDP and 
therefore in tax revenues. 
In terms of the relative impact of Brexit: 
x Other Primary is still the hardest hit in percentage terms although the impact is lower 
than in the Norway scenario ± employment 3-5% lower than would otherwise be the 
case; output 4-7% lower; 
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x The service sectors experience greater relative reductions than in the Norwegian case. 
Wholesale & Retail trade, Transportation & Storage are expected to see employment 
and output 3-4% lower. Information and communication services are expected to see 
employment and output 2-3% lower22. 
 
Figure 4: Long-term level change in value added in the µSwitzerland scenario¶ 
  
Source: Fraser of Allander Institute 
7KHµ:72¶PRGHO 
The modelling of the WTO scenario shows the largest anticipated reductions in economic 
activity, as summarised in Table 5. In the long term (reached after around 10 years): 
x GDP is expected to be over 5% (£8bn in 2015-16 terms) lower than would otherwise be 
the case and exports over 11% lower; 
x Real wages are expected to be 7% lower, equivalent to a reduction of around £2,000 per 
year; 
x The number of people employed is 3% lower (around 80,000 jobs). 
 
 
 
                                                          
22
 $PRGHVWSRVLWLYHLPSDFWLVDQWLFLSDWHGIRUµPHFKDQLFDODQGRWKHUPDQXIDFWXULQJ¶± this reflects the fact that, 
relatively speaking, it experiences smaller negative trade shock than other sectors but benefits from the reduction in 
real wages and depreciation in the real exchange rate. 
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Table 5: WTO model: long-term % changes relative to baseline 
 % change 
GDP -5.3 
Exports -11.3 
Real wages -7.2 
Employment -3.2 
Population +3.0 
Source: Fraser of Allander Institute 
The contribution of each sector to the fall in GDP is apparent from Figure 5, with all sectors 
more adversely impacted than even under the pessimistic Swiss case: 
x As before, the biggest contraction in value added is experienced by Wholesale & Retail 
Trade, Transportation & Storage sector; 
x Again, Professional Services & R&D; Public Administration; and Other Primary are the 
2nd, 3rd and 4th hardest hit in terms of value added. 
 
Figure 5: Long-term level change in value added in the 'WTO scenario' 
  
Source: Fraser of Allander Institute 
In terms of the relative impacts on employment and output across sectors: 
x Other Primary is again the hardest hit, with employment around 9% lower and output 
around 10% lower in the long term than would otherwise be the case; 
x In percentage terms, the Chemicals and Pharmaceutical, Electrical Manufacturing and 
Rubber, Cement, Glass & Metals sectors again suffer larger reductions in output and 
employment than other sectors; 
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x The impact on the Wholesale & Retail trade, Transportation & Storage sector is smaller 
in percentage terms, but this sector is a large employer, so it translates into relatively 
large fall in overall employment level. 
WTO scenario - fiscal effects 
A key area of debate in the referendum was the net fiscal contribution of the UK to the EU23. 
To account for this, we model the positive effects resulting from higher public expenditure in 
the UK as a result of reduced EU contribution (even after maintaining existing EU spending in 
both Scotland and rUK).  
The extent of the positive fiscal effects will depend upon the negotiated settlement ± both 
Norway and Switzerland make contributions to the EU budget.  It is only under the WTO 
scenario that UK public sector expenditure would benefit from the full saving of the current 
net EU contribution. 
7KH8.¶VQHW(8FRQWULEXWLRQZDVEQLQ7KLVWDNHVDFFRXQWWKH8.UHEDWHDQG
receipts such as CAP and EU structural funds (and assumes that the UK Government 
replaces all EU expenditures in the UK). 
Suppose, for example, that the 6FRWWLVK*RYHUQPHQW¶VEXGJHWZDVLQFUHDVHGE\P
of the UK figure).  We assume that both the UK and Scottish Governments spend the 
additional resource (rather than using it, for example, to reduce the deficit). Table 6 below 
sets out the long-term effects of this. 
Table 6: Fiscal effects: long-term % changes relative to baseline 
 % change 
GDP +1.0 
Exports -0.4 
Employment +1.1 
Scottish Government expenditure +3.9 
Source: Fraser of Allander Institute 
Note that these are the effects of the fiscal stimulus in isolation i.e. not taking into account the 
trade impacts set out above. As expected the increase in government expenditure in isolation 
                                                          
23
 6HH%R[LQ6FRWODQG¶V%XGJHW- https://www.sbs.strath.ac.uk/economics/fraser/20160913/ScotlandsBudget-
2016.pdf  
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stimulates GDP and employment, but leads to some crowding out in exports as the real wage 
increases in this case (in response to the stimulus to demand).   The combined effect is 
considered below. 
WTO scenario ± tariff effects 
In the WTO scenario, the UK would cease to be covered by the EU Single Market.  In one 
scenario, if the UK was to leave the EU without a trade deal, then WTO tariffs could apply to 
EU trade.  Ebell & Warren (2016) research suggests that, in the long term, there would be an 
average 2% increase in trade tariffs. 
It is possible to assess the effect of a 2% increase in tariffs applied to EU trade.  Their results 
suggest that, in isolation from other effects, this would result in GDP being 0.8% lower than 
would otherwise be the case after 10 years.   
The sectors most affected are the Food & Drink sector; Electrical Manufacturing and 
services.  
It should be noted that the actual outcome will vary by sector depending upon the exact tariff 
arrangement by product.  
WTO model ± combined effect 
Figure 6 illustrates the long-term impact of Brexit on Scottish and rUK GDP under the WTO 
model. 
The first two columns indicate the decline in Scottish and rUK GDP directly attributable to 
non-tariff barriers. The middle two columns indicate that if the net fiscal savings from Brexit 
are used to fund increased government expenditure, this mitigates the impact of the shock. 
Finally, the imposition of tariffs on EU trade exerts a further negative impact. In each case, 
the impact on the rUK economy exceeds that for Scotland.   
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Figure 6: Percentage change in long-term *'3LQ6FRWODQGDQGU8.LQµ:726FHQDUiR¶ 
 
Source: Fraser of Allander Institute 
 
WTO model ± labour productivity effects 
Finally, a further potential consideration is the potential impact on labour productivity.  In their 
analysis, HM Treasury assumed that Brexit would have a negative impact on labour 
productivity, based on research suggesting that more open economies are also more 
productive.   
The productivity assumption has not been universally adopted. Indeed it remains 
controversial, as although economists tend to agree in principle, the actual scale is much 
more uncertain.  
For completeness however, it is possible to incorporate such an assumption into our 
modelling. For example, the long-term effect of incorporating a direct reduction of 5% in 
labour productivity is set out in Table 7.  Again, these results show the impact of the 
reduction in labour productivity in isolation from other effects. 
Table 7: Labour productivity effects: long-term % change relative to baseline 
 % change 
GDP -4.8 
Real wage -2.3 
Employment -0.6 
Source: Fraser of Allander Institute 
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6. Conclusions 
In this report we explore the possible consequences of Brexit for the Scottish economy. 
However, since Brexit impacts simultaneously on both the Scottish and rUK economies, and 
since they are inextricably linked through interregional trade and migration flows, we model 
the likely impacts on both. While there have been a number of studies of the impact of Brexit 
on the UK macroeconomy, ours is the first attempt to model its regional impact. We employ 
an interregional computable general equilibrium (CGE) model of Scotland and rUK 
developed by the Fraser of Allander Institute. 
We find that Brexit has a negative impact on the Scottish economy, even under more 
optimistic assumptions about future trading arrangements. However, we also find that 
impacts on the rUK economy are more severe than those on Scotland. To a degree this acts 
to cushion the impacts on the Scottish economy as the shock induces net migration into 
Scotland from rUK. 
The scale of the long-term impact depends on the precise trading arrangements negotiated 
post Brexit. The more optimistic, VW\OLVHGµ1RUZD\VFHQDULR¶, suggests a range of long-term 
effects from a decline of 2% to just over 3% of GDP, while the default WTO case, implies a 
decline of 5% given the overall impact of non-tariff and tariff barriers and fiscal effects in this 
case. 
These are not the worst case scenarios, however. Some, including HM Treasury, have 
argued that there are potentially dynamic effects ± for example, if labour productivity is 
positively linked to the openness of an economy. In the Scottish case inward investment 
tends to be associated with higher productivity, and any decline could have a relatively larger 
impact here. While we do not build such effects into our core scenarios, we do separately 
simulate the impact of lower labour productivity and find that it would indeed have a 
significant additional negative effect. 
A further distinctive feature of our analysis is its ability to identify sectoral distribution impacts. 
The macroeconomic studies of the impact of Brexit on the UK as a whole are typically highly 
aggregated. 
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The most straightforward way ± and arguably most important in the short-term ± to examine 
the potential impact by sector is simply to examine those sectors which trade most pre-
dominantly with the EU. The Scottish Government publishes Export Statistics Scotland each 
year which provides an estimate of exports to the EU.  
This helps identify those sectors which not only trade the most with the EU but also for which 
the EU comprises a particularly large share of the overall international export market. This 
analysis identifies Food & Drink, Other Primary, Wholesale and various professional services 
as being areas to focus upon.  
Looking at export markets can only take you so far, as in practice any shock to the economy 
± such as Brexit ± has much wider effects than just on exports. It will influence overall 
competitiveness, wages, levels of investment, tax revenues and wider economic activity in 
Scotland and the UK as a whole.  
To illustrate this we make use of our multi-sectoral model of Scotland.  Our model identifies 
the effects across eighteen sectors of the economy.  
While the sectoral distribution of effects does vary with the precise form of Brexit, typically, 
those sectors that contribute most to the decline in GDP are: Wholesale & Retail Trade, 
Transportation and Storage; Professional Services & R&D; Public Administration and Other 
Primary. The first three of these also tend to register the greatest falls in employment. 
While the sectoral impacts are, of course, of interest, they merit careful interpretation. In 
particular, as we are undertaking a macroeconomic assessment we effectively assume an 
aggregate shock across all sectors. The sectoral differentiation of the shocks are therefore 
driven by a complex combination of factors, including direct EU-export intensity of the sector, 
size, sensitivity to competitiveness effects and inter-regional linkages. It is therefore a 
macroeconomic assessment.  
The exact impact by type of product will in practice be driven by a number of additional 
complex microeconomic factors such as the specific individual non-tariff and tariff barriers 
relevant not just for sectors but individual products. Our analysis should be seen as a helpful 
guide to what individual sectors are worthy of particular detailed examination.  
Another extension of our analysis would be to consider the potential role of migration 
between the UK and the rest of the world (including the EU). While we have not explicitly 
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modelled the impact of Brexit on the (rest of the) EU, the scale of these effects are likely to 
be proportionately smaller than the impacts on Scotland and rUK given the relative size of 
the economies. It could be argued that Brexit may make both Scotland and rUK less 
attractive locations to live and work relative to the rest of the world, since both experience 
significant falls in real wages and fewer employment opportunities in our modelling. Any 
induced net out-migration would increase the scale of the decline in the economy.24  
Future research could consider alternative scenarios as appropriate. As negotiations proceed 
it may be possible to narrow the range of projected outcomes, once greater clarity is 
forthcoming about possible future trade relations. The present study has not attempted to 
incorporate any estimate of trade deals with 3rd countries. Clearly, however, successful trade 
negotiations, and indeed EU and rest of the world growth, could mitigate some of the impacts 
identified here.  
  
                                                          
24
 Some part of this flow would likely be return migration. We have conducted one limiting simulation, assuming UK and 
EU labour markets were completely integrated. This added significantly to the contraction in both Scotland and rUK. 
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